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The 2012 Strategic Monitor predicted that in the area of science and technology, the 
dominance of (Western) state actors would shift towards non-Western and non-state 
actors. New technology is increasingly being commercially developed and is freely 
available to all players, as the previous report concluded. Yet state actors are still 
dominant in some areas, such as space. From this diffuse image, the 2012 Strategic 
Monitor noted a shift towards the fragmentation scenario and for that reason placed 
science and technology in the fragmentation quadrant. The developments outlined in 
the previous edition appear to have partially continued in the past year. However, there 
have also been a number of significant changes. In this chapter, we will reassess the 
conclusions of the 2012 Strategic Monitor based on the latest developments in science 
and technology.
1 Significant changes in the past year
The developments of the past year showed a trend towards fragmentation as well as 
some elements in the direction of a greater role for the state. The overall picture is 
therefore quite diffuse.
Developments in recent years have broadened the freedom of access to new 
technologies and knowledge for non-state actors. 3D printers that produce objects in 
plastics are now being sold for anywhere between several hundreds to thousands of 
euros. As a result, print products are becoming publicly available. In open-access online 
libraries, design files of a growing number of parts and complete products are publicly 
shared. In the past year, certain open-source projects received much attention for 
developing designs for a handgun and for a self-replicating 3D printer.
In the digital domain, hacktivists remained active in 2012, extending the trend of growing 
cyber crime (Symantec; Sophos 2012). State-sponsored digital attacks have increased 
in the past year, but identifying the culprits remains difficult. It is suspected that recent 
attacks on the energy sectors of countries such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the US, 
Canada, and Vietnam are the work of state-sponsored actors, although to date, hard 
evidence is lacking. Such attacks aim to both steal information and Research and 
Development (R&D) designs (cyber espionage) and disable systems (cyber sabotage). 
In addition to companies, military organisations, ministries, and think tanks in primarily 
Western—but also non-Western countries—have been targeted in the past year. Often, 
the work of Chinese hackers is suspected, although Russia, Iran, Israel, and the United 
States are also likely to have been active in this area in 2012.
Although digital security was discussed in various international forums over the past 
year, a common conceptual framework and shared norms are still lacking. No concrete 
progress has been made in the area of an international cyber security convention. At the 
national level, states have expanded their (integrated) digital security policy and thus 
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both their abilities and powers in this area. The control and prevention of cyber crime is 
currently one of the priorities of governments (see Box 1 for further details).
Several states have worked on legislation in the past year to enable them to exercise 
control over parts of networks and telecommunications. During the World Conference 
on International Telecommunications in Dubai, proposals to place internet protocols 
under the supervision of states were supported by a majority of countries, including 
Russia, China, the African countries, and countries in the Middle East. In some cases, 
citizens have opposed such legislation, which in their eyes limits the freedom of the 
digital world. Protest movements arose against the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), the 
Protect IP Act (PIPA), and the Anti-counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA).
The field of robotics has developed further. Just as with 3D printers, small commercial 
drones have become cheaper and more accessible to individuals. More and more states 
are adding military robots to their arsenals, including both armed and unarmed aircraft 
(UAVs). The United States has frequently used its UAVs during attacks in Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen as well as for operations (including intelligence 
operations) over the Philippines, Iran, Libya, Mali, and Syria. Non-state actors such 
as Hamas and drug cartels from Central America have also used UAVs, but the US 
still leads in the area of military robotics. This year the US launched the first armed 
unmanned surface vessel.
The complexity of viruses and attacks has increased rapidly in recent years. These types 
of crime focus on such things as stealing credit card data and plundering online bank 
accounts. In addition, private data has become an increasingly popular target. Especially 
individual consumers and their mobile devices remain a weak link in the protection against 
cyber crime. In early 2013, the US Cyber Crimes Watch published its annual Cyber Crime 
Statistics. The report showed that 75 million so-called scam emails are sent every day; that 
at the global level roughly 65 percent of internet users have had to deal with cyber crime, 
and that 25 percent of cyber crime remains unsolved.
There are different types of cyber crime. At the global level, malware—better known as 
malicious software—and computer viruses are the most common form of cyber crime (54 
percent), followed by online scams (11 percent) and internet fraud (10 percent), also known 
as phishing. A recent report published by Norton shows that young people, women, and 
inhabitants of emerging countries are most at risk of becoming a victim of cyber crime 
(Norton 2012).
Enormous costs are associated with cyber crime. In the past year alone, the costs due to 
cyber crime in 24 countries amounted to some 388 billion dollars (Norton 2012).
Box 1 The increasing complexity and impact of cyber crime
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In the field of space, SpaceX became the first commercial company to supply the space 
station ISS last year. Continuous development of space drones such as the experimental 
X-37B (US) and Shenlong (China) is perpetuating multipolar tensions over military space 
programmes. Commercial non-state space initiatives are developing steadily, but this 
area continues to be dominated by state actors (with the exception of satellite capacity 
where commercial parties have a certain presence).
Scenario framework
On the one hand, non-state actors gained influence in the past year. In terms of security 
policy, they were characterised by non-cooperation, resulting in fragmentation. On 
the other hand, states tried to enhance their grip on technology issues, whereby the 
international cooperative element was largely missing. In this sense, a certain degree of 
multipolarity exists.
2 The next five to ten years: Probabilities and uncertainties
Probabilities
- New technologies will be widely available for both state and non-state actors.
- Government regulation of technology and control of the digital space will likely increase.
- The development of an ‘internet of things’ makes it more likely that a cyber attack, 
sabotage, or disruption would have significant social, economic, or military 
consequences.
- Although with drones, a human operator retains final control, a discussion is likely to 
arise on the gray area of sanctioned autonomous acts.
Uncertainties
- To what extent will state actors retain their technological superiority in future conflicts, 
given that non-state actors have access to the same technologies as states?
- Are governments able to regulate and control digital space, and will citizens accept the 
negative consequences of this?
- Will weapons systems from space—or against targets in space—be used?
- What are the risks of biotechnology and nanotechnology for the human race and the 
environment?
For the next five to ten years, it is likely that a number of developments in the field of 
science and technology will continue. This will make new products and applications 
available, but it can also bring social and international political changes with it. There are 
also implications for the armed forces (see Box 2).
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Over the past few years, militaries around the world have been downsized, both in terms of 
materiel and personnel. At the same time, the qualitative capabilities and responsibilities of 
materiel and personnel have increased, and more and more tasks are being centralised—
with the help of technology—by the individual soldier and the weapons platform. In Europe 
and the US, this trend is reinforced by the pressure of shrinking defence budgets, which 
gives rise to attempts to get more value for one’s money. In the BRICS countries, defence 
spending has increased in recent years—a trend that is part of the modernisation of their 
forces.
The defence priorities of the United States will in the coming years be focused on power 
projection and smaller and more rapidly deployable forces. In concrete terms, they will focus 
on special operations forces (supported by information and high-tech materiel), maritime 
capabilities (including unmanned USVs), unmanned or manned long-range surveillance and 
strike capabilities, and digital warfare. China seems to be following American technological 
developments closely and has invested in aircraft carriers, stealth aircraft, missile 
technology, space, drones, and cyber warfare capabilities. Within Europe, the prioritisation 
is unclear due to the lack of a common strategic vision. European efforts within the EU 
are likely to focus on limited stabilisation and reconstruction operations that rely less on 
defence technology.
The gap in military technology between Europe and the US remained large in 2012. Under 
pressure from spending cuts, modernisation of the armed forces in the EU will probably 
occur more slowly than in the US, with some small European countries possibly delaying 
modernisation plans for years to come. This gap could conceivably be reduced in the 
future through improved European defence cooperation and the development of a common 
European defence industry. But in times of economic crisis and budget cuts, it is uncertain 
whether and to what extent the political will for this can be found.
Box 2 Armed forces and technology
The most likely technological developments are:
- continued robotisation and automation;
- further digitisation;
- increased connectivity to networks;
- increase in numbers and quality of sensors;
- increase of capacity in data aggregation;
- further developments in algorithms and smart software;
- further opportunities in creating and manipulating nano-, bio-, and 
neurotechnologies.
The above developments will converge and reinforce each other in the coming years, 
making a number of products and applications—as well as their further implementation—
possible.
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Sensors for images, sound, temperature, materials analysis, GPS, and generic 
reprogrammable sensors will probably become cheaper and will be used in a combined 
fashion in many products, from consumer devices to buildings, roads, and lights. Devices 
and sensors will increasingly be connected to digital networks, the so-called internet 
of things, allowing large amounts of data to be aggregated. The development of better 
algorithms and software ensures that these massive data sets (big data) can be used to 
generate (real-time) insights. This can involve situational awareness in crisis situations, 
the optimisation of business processes, or the monitoring of and developing insight 
into complex ecological, sociological, and social phenomena. As a result, society’s 
vulnerability to failure, malfunction, or deliberate disruption will increase.
These technologies will also be used to automate and robotise more functions. The 
development of better artificial intelligence and new materials will make more, smaller, 
more efficient and/or autonomous robotics possible. On the one hand, these will be 
individual machines designed to take on a single task or a group of tasks. On the other 
hand, large groups of small machines will work together in swarms to accomplish their 
task. Military robots will increasingly be automated. Although a human operator will 
retain ultimate control over the use of force, a discussion is likely to arise on the gray 
area of sanctioned autonomous acts, especially in combat situations where artificial 
intelligence yields a greater chance of survival via its quicker and more efficient actions.
In the field of biotechnology and genetic engineering, cheap genome analysis will make 
more personalised medical treatments possible. Implants and protheses for, amongst 
others, senses will be improved in the coming years.
Online collaborative networks make it increasingly possible to use the knowledge and 
skills of the collective via open-source. A growing group of people with internet have 
access to not only education, advice, software, entertainment but also designs that 
can be printed out on 3D printers. The ‘digital divide’ between those who benefit from 
digital technologies and those who do not will become smaller. However, people without 
internet access—some 4.6 billion in 2012—will increasingly be at a great social and 
economic disadvantage.
The digitisation, automation, and robotisation of production and services and the 
increasing demand for high-tech and digital products and services is resulting in 
qualitative knowledge becoming more valuable for economic activities (Brynjolfsson 
2011). Parts of the industrial design and production processes will be more decentralised 
to collaborative networks or individuals who generate bottom-up innovation. It is likely 
that these parts of the production process will be placed closer to the product developer 
and the consumer. The United States and Europe are strong in terms of knowledge 
and have large consumer groups, so they are well positioned to benefit from this 
development. It is uncertain whether the developments expected in the next five to ten 
years will significantly affect international economic relations. The growing importance 
of digital production and the portability of digital designs and products is likely to lead 
to further tensions among companies as well as states regarding the protection of 
intellectual property against espionage, piracy, and patent infringement.
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In the next decade, technological superiority is likely to become more diffuse. With 
the further integration of computers, sensors, network connectivity, databases, and 
artificial intelligence in personal devices, the individual has more and more possibilities 
within his/her reach. Through digitisation, global marketplaces, and 3D printing, 
new technologies and products will rapidly become commercially available to a wide 
audience. Hence, non-state actors will have more opportunities to assert their influence. 
These developments is likely to strengthen the position of central nodes in networks 
that have access to large amounts of sensors, information flows, and databases and 
that have the capacity and resources to transform this information into products and 
services. Examples include not only Google, IBM, and Huawei but also intelligence 
services and online criminal syndicates.
As a result of the benefits of automation and big data, more and more elements of 
the economy and society will de facto be run by algorithms that determine optimal 
choices. The increasing complexity of systems and the issues they deal with will lead to 
a decline in humans’ understanding of, insight into, and control over these systems. Our 
dependence on these algorithms entails risks of disruption when they crash or when 
data sets are misinterpreted.
Soldiers prepare drones on the deck of the USS Tortuga.
Photo: Official US Navy Imagery
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These technological developments cause our dealings with each other to change, while 
empathy and solidarity are coming under strain (Konrath 2011). The generations growing 
up in the digital age may be less inclined to conform to contemporary social and political 
structures and to support the approach to issues of general interest such as ageing and 
the protection of international law. It is, however, uncertain to what extent this trend 
will be articulated in the coming years due to the influence of other social and political 
variables.
Due to technological developments, the social and security challenges that states face 
are becoming more complex and difficult to control. Partly because of this, states are 
likely to try to get a better grip on these challenges. Governments will probably attribute 
more powers to themselves in an attempt to regulate the use of certain technologies. 
At the same time, technology will also be used for the benefit of governments, for 
example to support policymaking with data analysis and mathematical models. Also, 
an increasing number of techniques may be used to monitor parts of society for any 
undesirable behaviour: this can be large group processes such as riots and mass 
hysteria or at the individual level, such as recognising patterns of behaviour that 
are associated with fraud, crime, or terrorism. In the context of national security, 
governments will collect large amounts of information through social media, the internet, 
cameras, transactions, and so on.
Attempts by governments to regulate the availability of dangerous technologies such 
as print weapons, hacker tools, or modified biological and genetic mass are likely to 
increase. It is also likely that states will expand their powers in the future to safeguard 
the functioning of critical parts of the digital infrastructure in times of emergency. We 
cannot rule out the possibility that governments will use means that could also influence 
the systems of innocent citizens and businesses.
It is uncertain whether these measures are sufficient for states to tackle the increasing 
influence of (non-cooperative) non-state actors. They also bring up fundamental 
questions regarding constitutional rights such as due process and privacy. It is 
uncertain, for example, to what extent the public or politicians will allow the monitoring 
of behaviour to be applied. Threats will increasingly have a transnational character. 
State intervention will increasingly be based on bilateral agreements with stakeholder 
countries but more ideally on multilateral governance agreements and arrangements 
with civil society and other non-state stakeholders.
Scenario framework
Technology is a catalyst for development and change. Actors that quickly recognise and 
implement the potential of technological developments can therefore obtain significant 
advantages. This applies to both cooperative and non-cooperative associations of state 
and non-state actors. As a result, the main development in the scenario framework for the 
next five to ten years cannot be estimated with much certainty. Given that non-state actors 
have in the past shown themselves to be adaptive and states generally change slowly, 
it is slightly more likely that non-state actors will gain more influence and will be more 
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non-cooperative than cooperative in the area of security. This means that a movement in 




- Western military superiority is neutralised.
- Large-scale failure of information systems and payments systems after a cyber attack.
- A massive Chinese cyber attack on US military networks, satellites, and command 
centres.
- Development of foolproof digital identification, verification, and traceability.
- Uncontrollable nanotechnology or biotechnology brings widespread and serious damage 
to people and the environment.
Relative to the previous edition of the Strategic Monitor, a number of strategic shocks 
within technology and science have remained the same.
Western military superiority is neutralised. Because many new technologies are 
readily available to various actors—both non-state actors and emerging powers—this 
shock has become slightly more likely. The military rise of the BRICS, especially China, 
also contributes to this.
Large-scale failure of information systems and payments systems after a 
cyber attack. As a result of the increasing integration and digitisation of critical 
equipment, the vulnerability to this shock has increased. Although this strategic shock 
is not unlikely, we cannot say much about its probability given the speed with which 
developments in the digital world are taking place.
A massive Chinese cyber attack on US military networks, satellites, and 
command centres overwhelms US digital defence and makes the deployment of US 
armed forces impossible. Although there are warnings in some circles of a digital Pearl 
Harbor, this shock is not likely.
Development of foolproof digital identification, verification, and traceability. 
Cyber attacks and crimes can be traced back to the source: cyber crime and ‘hacktivism’ 
decline dramatically; states will no longer be able to deny responsibility for a cyber 
attack, making it occur less frequently, but cyber attacks will have greater political 
impact. This shock has become somewhat more likely as a result of technological 
developments and the call for more regulation.
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In addition to the strategic shocks already mentioned in the previous Monitor, we have 
added a new strategic shock: uncontrollable nanotechnology or biotechnology 
brings about widespread and serious damage to people and the environment. 
This shock has become slightly more likely because these materials are often used, but 
an incident of catastrophic magnitude seems unlikely.
4 Winners and losers
The winners and losers are among both state and non-state actors, whereby the 
category of non-state actors in general can be seen as the winner. Cyber criminals have 
significant leeway, and the profits of cyber crime continue to increase. Drug cartels 
also understand how to take advantage of technological developments such as drones. 
Despite the fact that some hacktivists were arrested over the past year, many other 
hacktivists were able to book successes. This form of activism seems to be gaining 
legitimacy. Governments are able to implement effective countermeasures only to a 
limited extent against such non-state actors. States are still losers in the relative sense, 
and it is uncertain whether this will change in the coming years.
In general, the further development of decentralised and digital production, 3D printers, 
and open-source information gives the non-state actor more opportunities. Actors 
who play a central role in networks and big data, such as Google and IBM, can be 
declared winners. The growing importance of high-quality knowledge in economic 
activities means that states with a strong knowledge infrastructure have a comparative 
advantage. Emerging economies using technologies that are available across the world 
can more rapidly catch up, but states that lag behind are likely to see the economic gap 
grow. Low-educated people in developed countries run the risk of being left out as their 
jobs become more and more automated and they are unable to make the transition to 
new work. The considerable number of people without access to the internet in a world 
undergoing large-scale digitisation are clear losers.
5 Implications for global security and stability
Developments in the field of science and technology affect larger processes and trends 
within the global system. First, globalising technologies make it possible for more players 
to participate in global economic, social, and political structures. Social and economic 
development, inclusion, and interdependence can have a dampening effect on local 
and regional instability, but at the same time rapid development can lead to adjustment 
problems within existing power structures at both the national and international levels. 
As a result, actors that don’t have a technological connection are more intensely hit, 
causing economic and social disparities to grow and the risk of deprivation and political 
violence to increase.
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In the digital domain, the increase in state-sponsored hackers and offensive military 
cyber programmes have a potential impact on global stability and security. Norms and 
regulatory mechanisms for cyber attacks are largely missing, and it is uncertain whether 
dampening mechanisms that in other cases prevent conflicts from escalating will also 
work for digital attacks.
The further development of defence technologies such as drones, missile technology, 
and military space initiatives are a source of tension between China and the United 
States.
Finally, the vulnerability of societies as a result of digitisation and the dependence 
on networks has increased. Due to free access to a wide range of technologies, the 
number of opportunities for non-state actors to pose a threat with limited resources has 
increased.
A cyber attack could mean that government agencies or national infrastructures 
are consciously switched off, but viruses can also have unintended effects on other 
systems at hospitals, banks, utility companies, or individuals. The disruption of critical 
infrastructure by a large-scale cyber attack can seriously affect national security. The 
complexity and diversity of systems means not only that there are many vulnerabilities 
but also that it is harder to simultaneously infiltrate or switch off these various systems 
on a large scale.
Developments in the field of biological, pharmaceutical, and genetic technology will 
make more medical treatments possible. These treatments will not necessarily be 
cheaper or more readily available, which in turn could put greater pressure on the health 
care system and its financial sustainability. A health care system in which money makes 
a big difference in longevity and quality can lead to polarisation.
Conclusion
Developments in technology and science continue unabated and seem to be happening 
more and more rapidly. In the coming years, developments in especially the digital 
domain will be influential, but also increasingly in nanotechnology, biotechnology, 
neurotechnology, and genetic technology. In terms of security, digital threats, 
robotisation, sensors, and artificial intelligence will determine a large part of the future. 
Technology has the potential to dramatically change social, economic, and international 
political systems, but it certainly does not stand alone. Social and political choices and 
processes determine how a new technology is implemented. Non-state actors seem 
to be very good at exploiting technologies due to their lack of restraint as well as their 
ability to adapt. The organising power of states remains significant, however, and has so 
far been able to make technology work to its advantage. In the next five to ten years, the 
non-alignment of non-state actors and the power of state actors will form an interesting 
field of tension.
